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t This tide is a modification of "the love that dare not speak its name," a euphemism
for homosexuality used by Oscar Wilde in one of his public speeches and often re-
peated by scholars to describe eras replete with homophobic intolerance. See, e.g.,
LILIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE
IN TWENIETH-CENTURY AMERIcA 139 (1991) (tiding a chapter on lesbians in the
post-WW II period "The Love that Dares Not Speak Its Name: McCarthyism and Its
Legacy"). Several authors have substituted "abuse" for "love" to refer to either the de-
nial of intimate abuse in same-gender couples or the lack of research and knowledge
about lesbian and gay domestic violence. See, e.g., Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse that Dare
Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in Massa-
chusetts, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 273 (1993).
• J.D. Candidate, May 2001, American University, Washington College of Law. B.S.,
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INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, numerous law journals and legal periodicals have
published articles focusing on domestic violence' in lesbian and gay
• • 2
male relationships. Many of these articles are critical of the feminist
1. Notes on terminology used in the subtitle and throughout this Article:
(1) In keeping with common parlance, "domestic violence" is used despite
criticisms that "domestic" trivializes the degree of violence or does not
apply to contexts other than cohabitating couples. See, e.g., Isabel Mar-
cus, Reframing "Domestic Violence"- Terrorism in the Home, in THE
PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENcE: THE DIsCOVERY OF DOMESTIC
ABUSE 11, 27 (Martha Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994)
(noting that attributing "the term 'domestic relations' to an issue tends to
remove it from the national civil rights agenda" and that the term
"domestic" often signals the segregation and limitation of inquiry on an
issue); Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered
Woman's Syndrome Expert Testimony for Gay Men and Lesbians Who Kill
Abusive Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1379, 1382 (1993) (noting that the
term "domestic" implies that violent occurrences within households
across America are "minor and uninteresting" and encourages society to
overlook the brutalization and terror that women in these situations expe-
rience); "Domestic violence" is construed broadly to include verbal,
emotional, psychological, mental, and physical forms of abuse, and is
used interchangeably with "domestic abuse," "intimate violence,"
"partner abuse," etc.
(2) Terms such as "same-gender" couple and "female-on-female" or "male-
on-male" domestic violence are interspersed with "lesbian" or "gay," to
recognize that one or both of the individuals in a same-gender couple
may identify as bisexual. For the same reason "opposite-gender" is used
along with "heterosexual."
(3) The term "gender" is used in reference to the dichotomies of female/
male, woman/man, girl/boy, and masculine/feminine. Although incon-
sistent with the convention of referring to physiological differences (i.e.
female/male) as "sex" and cultural distinctions (i.e. feminine/masculine,
woman/man, girl/boy) as "gender," the exclusive use of "gender" under-
scores the "socially constructed, overlapping nature of all category
distinctions, even the biological ones." SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS
FROM THE INTERSEXED 134 n.2 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why Doesn't Anyone Talk About Gay and Lesbian
Domestic Violence?, 18 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 23 (1996); Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing
Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of In-
timate Violence, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 582 (1996); Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex
Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8
TEMP. POL. & Crw. RTS. L. REv. 325 (1999); Lundy, supra note t; Ruthann Robson,
Lavender Bruises: Intralesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. Rev. 567 (1990); Angela West, ProsecutorialActivism: Confronting Het-
erosexism in a Lesbian Battering Case, 15 H-Lv. WOMEN'S LJ. 249 (1992); Bricker,
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model of domestic violence, which considers patriarchy to be the un-
derlying cause of violence against women, and point out that gendered
explanations of why men batter their female partners cannot account for
same-gender abuse While each article concentrates on a different as-
pect of same-gender domestic violence-from the applicability of
battered woman's syndrome to gay men4 to a deconstruction of gender
stereotypes in the legal discourse surrounding lesbian battering5-most
characterize same-gender domestic violence in terms of a non-gendered
model of domestic violence.' This legal scholarship focuses on reported
similarities between heterosexual and same-gender domestic violence,
and calls for gender neutral theories.!
While models of domestic violence which are based entirely on the
phenomena of male-on-female abuse will obviously not shed much light
on the subject of same-gender abuse, there is still a great deal of debate
among social scientists over whether all intimate violence-regardless of
the gender of the abuser and the victim-is sufficiently similar to be
explained through one comprehensive theory.8 Unfortunately, most le-
gal scholarship does not adequately portray this uncertainty.
supra note 1; Carla M. da Luz, Note, A Legal and Social Comparison of Heterosexual
and Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and Re-
sponse, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 251 (1994); David S. Dupps, Note,
Battered Lesbians: Are They Entitled to a Battered Woman Defense?, 29 J. FAM. L. 879
(1991); Nancy E. Murphy, Note, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-
Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 335 (1995). See also Patricia G. Barnes,
"It's Just a Quarrek" Some states offer no domestic violence protection to gays, A.B.A. J.
Feb. 1998 at 24; American Bar Association Domestic Violence, Who is Most Likely
To Be Affected by Domestic Violence? (explaining that domestic violence crosses various
socio-economic lines including sexual orientation) (last visited Feb. 19, 2000)
http://www.abanet.org/domviollwhois.html.
3. See, e.g., Knauer, supra note 2, at 327 ("Same-sex domestic violence also challenges
our highly gendered (and heteronormative) understanding of domestic violence be-
cause it cannot be explained by reference to gender difference [or] the historical
subjugation of women.. .
4. See Bricker, supra note 1.
5. See Goldfarb, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Lundy, supra note t, at 275 (rejecting the tendency to perceive domestic
violence in "sex-based terms"); Bricker, supra note 1, at 1383 n.20 ("This Note as-
sumes that intimate violence and its effects are not gender-specific."); da Luz, supra
note 2, at 252 n.6 ("mhis Article assumes that partner abuse and its effects are not
gender-specific.").
7. See, e.g., Bricker, supra note 1, at 1437 ("Intimate violence.., does not appear to
discriminate between heterosexual and same-sex partners. Our theories.., should
reflect this reality.").
8. See infra Part I.B.
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Overall, the legal discourse pertaining to same-gender domestic
violence misinterprets or misrepresents social science data and research
in three ways. First, legal writings often state that same-gender domestic
violence is as prevalent as male-on-female domestic violence.9 However,
most studies of same-gender domestic violence examine the dynamics of
abuse rather than the prevalence, providing no support for assertions of
parity. Second, legal writings often fail to distinguish between female-
on-female and male-on-male domestic violence, but instead refer to
same-gender abuse generally. ° In contrast, most of the studies cited in
legal scholarship focus exclusively on domestic violence in either lesbian
or gay male couples, but not both. Third, legal writings often do not
disclose or discuss methodological problems within the studies cited."
In particular, one measure of domestic violence, the Conflict Tactics
Scale ("CTS"), has been heavily criticized when used to study abuse in
heterosexual relationships.' 2 Yet much of the legal discourse pertaining
to same-gender domestic violence relies on studies that apply this meas-
ure to gauge degrees of same-gender abuse without any consideration of
its shortcomings, either generally or in this particular context.
This article argues that while recent legal scholarship effectively
disputes the applicability of a gendered model of domestic violence to
same-gender abuse, it goes too far in embracing a completely gender-
neutral model. Part I explains the theoretical problems with the non-
gendered model of domestic violence by examining in detail the re-
search which is most often cited in legal writings in support of this
model. Part II briefly explores the pragmatic implications for lesbian
and gay male victims of domestic violence when law enforcement poli-
cies such as mandatory arrest are based on a model of domestic violence
which ignores contexts such as gender. Finally, Part III recommends
initially abandoning any single model of domestic violence that assumes
a priori gender neutrality, and instead constructing multiple models
limited to specific contexts and dynamics. Once these multiple models
have been adequately assessed and tested, their common threads can be
identified and woven into an integrated meta-model.
9. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. See infta Part I.D.




A. The Non-Gendered Model ofDomestic Violence
Most legal scholars addressing same-gender domestic violence ex-
press a similar purpose for writing their articles-to increase the
responsiveness and efficacy of the legal system. 3 For example, one
author intends her article "to offer suggestions for improving legal and
other assistance" to victims of same-gender domestic violence,14 while
another intends to "findfwithout merit, challenges to expanding the
law to include same-sex partner abuse in domestic violence statutes." 5
The argument for expanding legal protection to include lesbian and gay
male couples is greatly bolstered by the assumption that same-gender
violence is equivalent to heterosexual or male-on-female violence, but
for the gender of the individuals involved. Indeed, two social scientists,
whose single study of same-gender domestic violence is often cited in
the legal scholarship,6 claim that "[d]omestic violence is not a gender
issue" at all. 7 They argue that diagnostic criteria, treatment approaches,
and laws should therefore be based solely on batterers' behavior rather
than on their gender.
This non-gendered, almost liberal feminist approach of judging
people by their actions rather than their gender stands in direct opposi-
tion to the gendered model of domestic violence which was formulated
13. See, e.g., Duthu, supra note 2, at 40 (outlining the "most immediate needs and goals
for San Diego County" in confronting same-gender domestic violence); Knauer, su-
pra note 2, at 350 (calling for "[a] more realistic view of same-sex relationships"
because "[o]nly then will domestic violence services live up to the promise of the
gender-neutral vocabulary currently in use by domestic violence activists"); Bricker,
supra note 1, at 1386-87 (describing her intent to explain how "stereotypes of and
prejudices against gay men and lesbians similarly undermine the fair adjudication of
their cases" and suggesting ways of counteracting this bias); Murphy, supra note 2, at
339 ("This Note will demonstrate that domestic violence between same-sex couples is
as serious a problem as domestic violence between opposite-sex couples, but that pre-
sent statutes provide victims of same-sex violence with less legal protection ....
Legitimate grounds exist for extending protection to victims of same-sex domestic
violence and this Note will propose model legislation that does so.").
14. Lundy, supra note t, at 274.
15. da Luz, supra note 2, at 255.
16. See infra Part I.B.1.
17. See DAVID ISLAND & PATRIcK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LovE
THEM 255 (1991).
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as part of the battered women's movement. 8 The initial gendered
model, which considers domestic violence a by-product of patriarchy
and male domination, relied exclusively on male-on-female violence,
specifically husband-on-wife violence. It was based in part on the his-
torical fact of men's proprietary interest in their wives, which entitled
them to treat their wives as property and employ what were then con-
sidered reasonable disciplinary measures."' The societal protection of a
private or domestic sphere reinforced the sanctity of the marital home
and helped to shield the abusive husband from any scrutiny."'
The legal changes advocated by domestic violence activists were
informed by this gendered model; thus, resulting domestic violence
statutes initially addressed male-on-female abuse only, although many
have since been amended or interpreted to apply to same-gender do-
mestic violence.2 ' However, the gendered model of domestic violence as
18. A history of the battered women's movement and a full explanation of the feminist
model of domestic violence are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally DEL
MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES (1976) (one of the initial feminist works on domestic
violence); SUsAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982) (a history of the early
battered women's movement); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979)
(the classic work on domestic violence which forms the basis of much of the current
understanding of the cycles and psychology of wife battering).
19. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 21 (discussing the "rule of thumb" and correction as
institutionalized "principle[s] that sex-based power and control in the home [were]
desirable as a matter of law and public policy"). The "rule of thumb" was an English
common-law limitation on the degree of violence that a husband could inflict on his
wife (he could not beat her with anything thicker than his thumb), while correction
was an American common-law doctrine which "granted permission to a husband to
inflict violence, characterized as 'discipline' or 'correction' upon his wife." Marcus,
supra note 1, at 21.
20. Coverture was a common law doctrine that legalized abuse of women in their hus-
band's homes. According to the Supreme Court, "At the common law the husband
and wife were regarded as one. The legal existence of the wife during coverture was
merged in that of the husband... [They were not liable for torts [e.g., assault, bat-
tery, intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress] committed by one against
the other." United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 52-53 (1960) (denouncing coverture
as "peculiar and obsolete," "a completely discredited... archaic remnant of a primi-
tive caste system" founded upon "medieval views" which are "offensive to the ethos of
our society").
21. Currently, 41 states and the District of Columbia have statutes which protect victims
of same-gender as well as opposite-gender domestic violence. See NATIONAL COALI-
TION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS [hereinafter NCAVP], ANTI-LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 1998, citingALA. CODE § 30-
5-1 et. seq. ( "present or former household members"); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 et.
seq. ("adults or minors who live together or who have lived together... who are
dating or who have dated... who are engaged in or who have engaged in a sexual
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relationship"); AsR. CODE 5 9-15-201 et. seq. (parties who are or were residing or
cohabitating together); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6200 et. seq., 6300 et. seq. ("a cohabi-
tant or former cohabitant" and "a person who the respondent is having or has had a
dating or engagement relationship"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-4-102 (parties who are
or were involved in an "intimate relationship" and parties who live or have lived to-
gether); CONN. GEN. STAT. % 46b-15, 46b-38c (parties who are or were residing
together); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005 (parties who share or have shared a residence
and parties who maintain or have maintained a "romantic relationship not necessarily
including a sexual relationship"); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 ("persons living or for-
merly living in the same household"); HAW. REv. STAT. § 586-3 et. seq. (family and
household members or persons residing or formerly residing in the same dwelling
unit); IDAHO CODE § 39-6302 et. seq. (parties who reside or have resided together as
"construed liberally"); 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/112A-14 (parties who are or were
living together, have or had a dating relationship, and includes persons with disabili-
ties and their personal assistants); IND. CODE §§ 34-26-2-1 et. seq. ("individuals at
least 18 years of age and emancipated minors"); IOWA CODE § 236.4 et. seq.
("persons cohabitating" currently or in the past year); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3105 et.
seq. (parties who reside or have resided together); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.75 et.
seq. ("unmarried couples who are living together or have formerly lived together");
ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 4001 et. seq. (individuals "presently or formerly
living together and individuals who are or were sexual partners"); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ch. 209A § 3 (persons who are or were residing together and persons who are or have
been in a "substantive dating or engagement relationship"); MICH. COMp. LAws
§ 27A.2950 et. seq. (persons who reside or have resided together or have or have had
a dating relationship); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (persons who reside or resided to-
gether or are "involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship"); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 455.010 et. seq. (adults who reside or have resided together); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-924 (persons who reside or resided together); NEv. REv. STAT. § 33.017
er. seq. (persons who are or were "actually residing" together or are or were in a dat-
ing relationship); N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4 (persons who are or were
cohabitating and are or were involved in a romantic relationship); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-28 (current or former household members and persons in "dating relation-
ships"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (persons with a "continuing personal
relationship"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-2 ("former and current household members."
However, NCAVP notes that this same statute "specifically provides that any protec-
tion order... will not serve as a defense to persons prosecuted for fornication,
adultery, or the 'crime against nature."' See Appendix B at 31.); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-02 (persons who are or were residing together, are in a dating relationship,
or "if the court determines that the relationship between that person and the alleged
abusing person is sufficient to warrant the issuance of a domestic violence protection
order"); Oro Ruv. CODE ANN. §§ 2919.26, 3113.31 ("person living as a spouse"
interpreted to include same-gender couples); OxiA. STAT. tit. 22 § 60.2 (family or
household members or persons who are or were in a dating relationship); OR. REv.
STAT. § 107.710 (persons who have been in sexually intimate relationship with
abuser); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108 (persons who are or were living as spouses or
current or former sexual or intimate partners); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 8-8.1-3 ("persons
who are or have been in a substantive dating.., relationship within the past six
months" and current or former cohabitants within the past three years); S.D. CoDI-
Fml LAws § 25-10-3 ("persons living in the same household" and "persons who have
2001]
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resulting from male supremacy does not adequately account for same-
gender abuse.22 For example, female partners have never possessed any
lived together"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606 (adults or minors who are or were
living together, dating, or having a sexual relationship and who are not the primary
aggressor); Tax. Fm. CODE ANN. § 85.022 (current and former "persons living to-
gether in the same dwelling, without regard to whether they are related to each
other"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 et. seq. (persons 16 and older who are or were
living as spouses or reside or resided in the same residence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15
§ 1103 (persons who "are living or have lived together, are sharing or have shared oc-
cupancy of a dwelling, are engaged in or have engaged in a sexual relationship, or
minors who are dating or who have dated"); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 26.50.010,
26.50.060, 26.50.070, 10.99.040, 10.99.050 (adults who reside or have resided to-
gether; persons over 16 who reside or resided together and have or had a dating
relationship; persons 16 and over who have or had a dating relationship, defined as "a
social relationship of a romantic nature"); W.VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (persons who are
or were living as spouses, who are or were dating, or are or were residing or cohabi-
rating together and current or former sexual or intimate partners); Wis. STAT.
§ 813.12 ("person[s] currently or formerly residing in a place of abode with another
person"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. % 35-21-103 (persons who are or were living together as
if married and "other adults sharing common living quarters"). Nine states do not
extend coverage of domestic violence protection to victims of same-gender domestic
violence. See AIuz. REv. STAT. §§ 13-3602, § 13-3624 (marital, blood, or opposite-
gender relationship); 10 DEL. CODE ANN.§ 1045 (marital, former marital, blood,
opposite-gender cohabitants, or opposite-gender parents of a child); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.30 (current or former "family or household members". However, since Florida
criminalizes same-gender sexual activity, prohibits same-gender marriage, and bans
gay men and lesbians from adopting children, the NCAVP classifies Florida as a state
where protection to victims of same-gender domestic violence is "arguably unavail-
able." See Appendix B at 29.); LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2131 et. seq. (unmarried
adults only if they reside together as common law spouses and if their children also
live with them); MD. CODE ANN. FAm. LAw § 4-501 et. seq. (cohabitants defined as
"a person who has had a sexual relationship with the respondent and resided with the
respondent in the home for a period of at least 90 days within one year before the
filing of the petition." However, the NCAVP classifies Maryland's statutory protec-
tion as "arguably unavailable" to victims of same-gender domestic violence because
"proving a sexual relationship may leave the victim vulnerable to prosecution under
state prohibition of 'unnatural or perverted sex practices' (Art. 27, § 554)." See Ap.
pendix B at 30.); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-1 et. seq. ("persons living as spouses."
NCAVP notes that it would be "probably difficult to prove that same-sex domestic
partners 'live as spouses' in a state with a sodomy law, a same-sex marriage ban, and
no statewide civil rights protection for LGBT persons." See Appendix B at 30);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (opposite-sex partners and family members); N.Y.
FAm. CT. AcT § 828 (parties who are related by consanguinity or affinity, legally
married, formerly married, or have a child in common); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-50
(blood and marital relationships and "a male and female" who are or were cohabitat-
ing); VA. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.1-253.1 et. seq. (parties who are or were cohabitating in
the past 12 months, specifically excluding roommates and same-gender relationships).
22. See, e.g., Robson, supra note 2, at 586 ("Intimate intra-lesbian violence threatens the
very gendered foundations of explanations for domestic violence.").
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legal proprietary interest in one another; on the contrary, courts have
often refused to recognize the ties between same-gender partners.23
Likewise, same-gender couples are neither afforded the "sanctity of mar-
riage" 24 nor the State's protection of their private, domestic sphere.25
In light of these and other perceived shortcomings, the gendered
model of domestic violence was increasingly challenged in the 1980s,
causing the non-gendered, quasi-liberal feminist model of domestic
violence to become more prevalent.26 While a non-gendered model un-
derlies much of the current legal scholarship pertaining to same-gender
domestic violence, it too cannot entirely explain same-gender domestic
violence.
23. See, e.g., Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1987) (ruling that a same-gender rela-
tionship is not a "dose relationship"); Patricia Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal
Tax Laws, 1 LAw & SExuAurrY 97 (1991) (discussing the effects of the Internal Reve-
nue Code's filure to recognize same-gender couples).
24. See Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (1996) ("In determining the meaning of
any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various ad-
ministrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage' means
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife.").
25. See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE
U.S. (April 2000) (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.ngltf.orgldownloads/
sodomymap0400.gif> (reporting that 18 states still have criminal sodomy laws).
26. See Mary Eaton, Abuse by Any Other Name, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE Vio-
LENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 195, 208 (Martha Albertson Fineman
& Roxanne Mykitiuk, eds., 1994). Eaton explains that the increasing prominence of
liberal feminist paradigms of domestic violence resulted from two factors:
(First, there was] the growing commitment by feminists to ensure that
theories of intimate abuse translated into the provision of concrete relief to
individual women and, concomitantly, the increasing willingness of some
grass-roots feminists movements to collaborate with the state in that en-
deavor .... [Second,] the cost of state support for such initiatives has been
the transmogrification of feminist discourse on domestic violence.
Another challenge to the radical feminist model of domestic violence came from a
group of male sociologists who disputed the gendered understanding of domestic
violence by daiming that women battered men as frequently as men battered women.
See, e.g., MURRAY A. STRAUSS & RIcHARD J. GELLEs, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERI-
cAN FAMINEs: RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES
104-05 (1995) (arguing that "within the family or in dating and cohabitating rela-
tionships, women are about as violent as men .... Unless women also forsake
violence in their relationships with male partners and children, they cannot expect to
be free of assault.").
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B. Revisiting the Claim ofEqual Frequency between Same-Gender
and Opposite-Gender Domestic Violence
Most of the legal articles on same-gender domestic violence include
copious citations to primary source studies, other legal scholars, and
non-academic periodicals, as well as statutes, cases, and other legal ma-
terials not being addressed in this Article. These sources, however, can
be traced back to a handful of preliminary studies, which are cited and
re-cited without sufficient analysis of their r . 27re-ite wthot f i   irreliability. While most legal
writings use these studies only as part of an introduction or as back-
ground, the continual use and repetition of data that is ungeneralizable
calls into question the arguments and theories-including the non-
gendered model of domestic violence-that grow out of or are sup-
ported by these unsubstantiated premises.
Legal scholarship claims that lesbian and gay domestic violence oc-
2'curs with the same frequency as heterosexual domestic violence -a
pivotal fact in the construction of the non-gendered model of domestic
violence. However, while social scientists are becoming increasingly in-
terested in same-gender domestic violence, relatively few studies have
been published.29 Thus, legal scholarship can only draw from the same
27. See, e.g., Duthu, supra note 2, at 23-24 n.4 (citing another legal author, Sandra E.
Lundy, to support statement that prevalence of same-gender domestic violence is
"very similar to those of heterosexual battering." Lundy cited Island & Letellier and
Renzetti.).
28. See Bricker, supra note 1, at 1388 ("[V]iolence probably occurs at the same rate as it
occurs in heterosexual households or in approximately twenty percent of all gay and
lesbian relationships."); Duthu, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that "it is generally ac-
cepted that domestic violence occurs in at least the same proportion in homosexual
relationships .. ." as in opposite-gender relationships); Goldfarb, supra note 2, at
591-92 ("[The evidence that does exist, largely anecdotal in nature, suggests that the
incidence of violence in gay and lesbian relationships is proportional to the incidence
of violence in heterosexual relationships."); Knauer, supra note 2, at 328-29 ("[Olne
thing that does seem clear is that same-sex domestic violence occurs with the same
frequency as opposite-sex domestic violence."); Lundy, supra note t, at 277 ("Most
researchers agree that the incidence of battering in lesbian and gay couples is about
the same as it is for heterosexual couples.. ."); Murphy, supra note 2, at 339
("Studies show that gay men and lesbians are victimized by abusive partners at rates
proportionately comparable to those found among opposite-sex couples.").
29. One 1999 article which "reviews and critiques the existing empirical literature ex-
amining interpersonal violence..." explored 19 studies. Leslie K. Burke & Diane R.
Follingstad, Violence in Lesbian and Gay Relationships: Theory, Prevalence, and Corre-
lational Factors, 19:5 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 487-512 (1999). See also infra note




small pool of studies. While some legal scholars offer a disclaimer about
the limitations of the research data on same-gender domestic violence, 30
they still persist in utilizing this data in formulating their arguments.
Several articles also cite two non-academic, non-peer-reviewed newspa-
per articles that reported some professionals' belief in equal frequencies
of same-gender and opposite-gender domestic violence based on their
own experiences. 3' Although legal scholars cannot easily assess the accu-
racy of individuals' personal observations, they can-and should-
carefully examine the few studies informing their work on same-gender
domestic violence.
Two books in particular are heavily cited in the legal scholarship on
same-gender domestic violence in support of the non-gendered model
of domestic violence: Men who Beat the Men who Love Them, by David
Island and Patrick Letellier; and Violent Betrayal Partner Abuse in Les-
bian Relationships, by Claire M. Renzetti. Upon closer analysis,
however, neither book significantly bolsters arguments for the non-
gendered model of domestic violence. Although these works are often
cited specifically to support statements of equal frequency of heterosex-
ual and same-gender domestic violence, neither book is a prevalence
study. While both include a brief one-to-two-page discussion of the fre-
quency of same-gender and opposite-gender domestic violence as part of
the introduction, the books focus on identifying factors which poten-
tially cause some lesbians and gay men to batter, and then assessing
available solutions.
30. See Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 591 (characterizing evidence of the frequency of same-
gender domestic violence as "largely anecdotal."); Knauer, supra note 2, at 328
(observing that "there remains little empirical work upon which to base conclusions
regarding same-sex domestic violence."); Bricker, supra note 1, at 1388 ("There are
no reliable statistics on the prevalence of intimate violence in the gay and lesbian
community."); Murphy, supra note 2, at 340 (remarking that "few studies and little
research has been done in the area of gay and lesbian violence").
31. See Bricker, supra note 1, at 1338 n.37; da Luz, supra note 2, at 267 n.80; Goldfarb,
supra note 2, at 591 n.33. All cite Elizabeth Rhodes, Closeted Violence: Authorities,
Experts Slowly Start to Offer More Help to Battered-and Battering-Partners of the
Same Sex, SEAr= TIMEs, May 23, 1991, at F1 ("[O]ur best guesstimate... is that
domestic violence is no less or no more prevalent than in the heterosexual commu-
nity."). See Bricker, supra note 1, at 1388 n.37; da Luz, supra note 2, at 267 n.80;
Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 592 n.40; Murphy, supra note 2, at 341 n.36. All cite Jane
Garcia, The Cost of Escaping Domestic Violence, LA. TIMES, May 6, 1991, at E2
(quoting "domestic abuse experts" as concluding that domestic violence "is as likely to
occur among lesbians as among heterosexual couples").
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1. Men who Beat the Men who Love Them
(by David Island and Patrick Letellier)
Many legal scholars cite Men who Beat the Men who Love Them3 2 to
support their assertions that the frequency of same-gender domestic
violence parallels that of opposite-gender domestic violence.33 Island and
Letellier's work does not support such claims for two reasons: (l)the
rates of same-gender domestic violence were not studied but rather de-
rived from studies of heterosexual abuse; and (2) Island and Letellier
assume, rather than prove, that the prevalence of domestic violence in
gay male relationships is higher than in either heterosexual or lesbian
relationships.
First, Island and Letellier merely approximate the rate of gay male
domestic violence by extrapolating from numerical estimates of the size
of the gay male population and the frequency of male-on-female do-
mestic violence:
4
The incidence of gay men's domestic violence can best be cal-
culated from the known rate of domestic violence among
heterosexuals. In 1990, there are 9,500,000 adult gay males in
the United States. If adult gay males couple at the same rate as
heterosexuals (64 percent), then 6,000,000 gay men are cou-
pled, with half of each couple (3,000,000) representing
potential victims. Multiplying 3,000,000 times the 10.9 per-
cent heterosexual battering rate yields a figure of 330,000 gay
male victims of domestic violence each year. 5
In other words, Island and Letellier assume from the outset that the
frequency of male-on-male domestic violence is the same as the fre-
quency of male-on-female domestic violence. Yet legal writings often
cite this initial, unsubstantiated assumption as though it were a conclu-
32. ISLAND & LETELLIER, supra note 17.
33. See da Luz, supra note 2, at 267 n.80; Duthu, supra note 2, at 28 n.30; Goldfarb,
supra note 2, at 591 n.39; Lundy, supra note t, at 277 n.21; Murphy, supra note 2,
at 340 n.35.
34. See CiAuR M. RENZETrI, VIoLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN RELA-
TIONSHIPS 17 (1992) (cautioning that "the methodology underlying [Island and
Letellier's] estimations has questionable reliability").
35. ISLAND & LETELLIER, supra note 17, at 14.
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sion 6 When legal articles do comment on the limitations of these esti-
mates, such warnings are only mentioned in a footnote. 7
Island and Letellier present no evidence that the frequency of gay
male domestic violence is similar to the frequency of heterosexual do-
mestic violence, but remark that "[t]here is no reason at all to believe
that the incidence of gay men's domestic violence is any less than that in
the heterosexual community."38 If domestic violence is not gendered at
all, as Island and Letellier conclude, 39 then perhaps their assertion of
equivalent rates of opposite-gender and gay male abuse would be accu-
rate. However, other researchers have found the prevalence of domestic
abuse in gay male relationships to range from 18 to 38 percent -not
the 10.9 percent assumed by Island and Letellier which raises doubts
about the accuracy of Island and Letellier's assumptions about the fre-
quency of gay male domestic violence and their non-gendered model.
Second, and even more fundamentally, in calculating their
estimates, Island and Letellier rely on the very gender-based
assumptions that they dismiss. They recognize that the frequency of gay
36. See, e.g., Bricker, supra note 1, at 1389 n.39 (referring to Island & Letellier study as
"empirical"); da Luz, supra note 2, at 267 n.80 (citing Island & Letellier as
"estimating that gay male partner abuse occurs in at least 20%, and possibly 50%, of
gay male relationships"); Murphy, supra note 2, at 340 (citing Island & Letellier after
stating that "estimates conclude that each year between fifty and one hundred thou-
sand lesbians are the victims of abuse and that as many as half a million gay men are
battered").
37. See Lundy, supra note t, at 278 n.24. Goldfarb writes:
If the rate of intimate violence in gay and lesbian relationships parallels
these [opposite-gender] rates, then hundreds of thousands of lesbians and
gay men are victims of intimate violence. In fact, David Island, co-author
of Men Who Beat the Men Who Love Them... estimates that in the
United States there are approximately 500,000 gay men and between
50,000 and 100,000 lesbians who are battered.
Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 592 n.40. Note that Goldfarb does not state explicitly that
the Island & Letellier study relied on just such an assumption of a parallel rate of
domestic abuse. But see Goldfarb, supra, at 590-01 (stating in the text that "[little
solid information exists about the source, pattern, and frequency of intimate violence
in same-sex relationships. The empirical research that would be required to develop
such understanding has only just begun."). Goldfarb also includes such caveats about
Renzetti's study, see supra, at n.33, 38, and refers to data on same-gender domestic
violence as "preliminary," see supra, at 597.
38. ISLAND & LETELUER, supra note 17, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
39. ISLAND & LETELLIER, supra note 17, at 2 ("Domestic violence is not a gender issue,
since both men and women can be either barterer or victim .... Individual acts of
domestic violence are not caused by... a violent, patriarchal society.").
40. See Gregory S. Merrill, Understanding Domestic Violence Among Gay and Bisexual
Men, in IssuEs IN INTIMATE VIOLENCE 129-30 (Raquel Kennedy Bergen ed., 1998).
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male domestic violence, which they assume to be 10.9 percent, may be
too conservative, not because of any research findings, but rather
because of gender differences between women and men:
Men in heterosexual couples commit 95 percent of the bat-
tering. But, there are two men present in a gay couple, which
means that either member has the same probability of being a
batterer. Therefore, the probability of violence occurring in a
gay couple is mathematically double the probability of that in
a heterosexual couple.
Second, one of the members in a gay male couple is not a
woman. Despite the fact that American society is violent, there
still exists a strong ethic not to hit women. Thus, even though
as many as 20 percent of the men in America batter their
wives, the vast majority of men do not hit women. Not so
with men, however. Men hit men with alacrity in America.4
By pointing out that men commit the vast majority of domestic
abuse, Island and Letellier acknowledge the gendered dynamic of do-
mestic violence. Island and Letellier's theory links the propensity for
domestic violence with men as men, regardless of their sexual orienta-
tion-the more men in the relationship, the higher the rate of domestic
violence. Therefore, Island and Letellier deduce that gay male couples
will have the highest rates of domestic violence and lesbian couples will
have the lowest rates of domestic violence, with heterosexual couples
falling in between. This rank ordering is hardly gender neutral; in fact,
it is explicitly based on a gendered understanding of domestic violence.
2. Violent Betrayal: Partner Abuse in Lesbian Relationships
(by Claire Renzetti)
Legal scholarship in this area also includes citations to Violent Be-
trayal: Partner Abuse in Lesbian Relationships43 as establishing the
comparable frequency between lesbian and male-on-female domestic
41. ISLAND & LETELLIER, supra note 17, at 14.
42. See generally Joyce Price, Domestic Violence Between Gays A Hidden Crisis, Counselors
Say, WASH. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at A3 (reporting on a presentation in which Island
estimated that "500,000 homosexual males and between 50,000 to 100,000 lesbians
annually are battered").




violence, or same-gender and opposite-gender domestic violence. 5
Such citations are incorrect, however, because Professor Renzetti's study
"was not designed to measure the prevalence of abuse in lesbian rela-
tionships,, 6 but rather to "address the issue of battering frequency in
lesbian relationships that may be characterized as abusive." 47 In other
words, Renzetti was studying the patterns of abuse within violent les-
bian relationships; she was not attempting to ascertain the ratio of
violent/abusive lesbian relationships to non-violent/non-abusive lesbian
relationships or the frequency of violence in lesbian relationships versus
the frequency of violence in non-!esbian relationships. Renzetti only in-
terviewed women who were involved in violent same-gender
relationships or who had been involved in abusive same-gender relation-
ships previously, and who self-identified as battered lesbians. 8 She
explicitly states that from her data "we cannot determine the prevalence
of abuse in lesbian relationships."" As with Men Who Beat the Men Who
Love Them, some of the legal scholarship explains the limitations of
Renzetti's study in footnotes.5"
Interestingly, Renzetti published a follow-up article six years after
Violent Betrayal was published to correct "common misunderstandings
about violence in lesbian relationships"5 caused by misinterpretations of
her study. Renzetti remarks:
I often see my research cited in support of the claim that les-
bian battering and heterosexual battering occur at similar
rates. My study, however, was not a study of prevalence;
rather, it showed that lesbian battering does occur, that it is
44. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 340 n.34 (citing Renzetti's statement that "[sltudies
report... that 25 percent of lesbians and 27 percent of heterosexual women admit
being physically abused by their partners in committed relationships").
45. See Lundy, supra note t, at 277 n.20 (citing Renzetti to support the statement that
"[mlost researchers agree that the incidence of battering in lesbian and gay couples is
about the same as it is for heterosexual couples-that is, approximately twenty-five to
thirty-three percent of all such couples").
46. RFNzE=rI, supra note 34, at 19.
47. RENzEa-TI, supra note 34, at 19.
48. RENzmrrI, supra note 34, at 13, 15 (discussing her research design).
49. RENZETTI, supra note 34, at 20.
50. See Knauer, supra note 2, at 329 n.15 ("Although not designed to determine the
prevalence of abuse in lesbian relationships, Renzetti's study does address the question
of the incidence of battering in abusive relationships and the forms the battering
takes.").
51. See Claire M. Renzetti, Violence and Abuse in Lesbian Relationships: Theoretical and
Empirical Issues, in IssuEs IN INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 40, at 117, 118.
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not so infrequent as to be an anomaly, and that once it occurs
it is likely to reoccur and increase in frequency and severity-
all important findings for responding to claims that lesbian
battering is not a problem worthy of serious scholarship or
domestic violence services, but none showing prevalence. In
fact, I regard with skepticism the studies that report a preva-
lence statistic for lesbian battering because the sampling
strategies they use simply do not allow for the measurement of
"true prevalence."52
In addition, this legal scholarship contains citations to Renzetti's
brief review of other studies.53 These second-hand citations are prob-
lematic in that they often misreport or skew the actual findings.
Without examining the original studies, any limitations which are not
mentioned by Renzetti will remain unrevealed.
As an example of the former problem, one legal article cites to
Renzetti for the proposition that "[m]ost researchers agree that the inci-
dence of battering in lesbian and gay couples is about the same as it is
for heterosexual couples-that is, approximately twenty-five to thirty-
three percent of all such couples" ---a citation to Renzetti's brief review
of other researchers' studies, rather than to Renzetti's work itself. How-
ever, the studies that Renzetti summarizes do not indicate a same-
gender domestic violence rate ranging from twenty-five to thirty-three
percent, but rather a range of 10.9 to 95 percent." Indeed, Renzetti
even comments on the next page (not cited in the article) that:
[lilt may appear at first glance that the incidence of partner
abuse is unusually high in lesbian relationships. However,
studies of homosexual partner abuse have had to utilize non-
random, self-selected samples. Therefore they are not true
prevalence studies.56
52. RENZE1rI, supra, note 51, at 119.
53. See, e.g., Lundy, supra note t, at 277.
54. Lundy, supra note t, at 277.
55. See RENzETrI, supra note 34, at 17-18. The 10.9 percent figure comes from ISLAND
& LETELLIER, supra note 17, andthe 95 percent comes from an unpublished study by
E.E. Kelly and L. Warshafsky, Partner Abuse in Gay Male and Lesbian Cotpes (July
1987).
56. REN7ZETI, supra note 34, at 19.
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Not only does this article mischaracterize the statistics reviewed by
Renzetti, it also ignores Renzetti's caution about using the studies as
true indicators of the frequency of same-gender domestic violence.
A different legal article cites to the same page in Renzetti to sup-
port the statement that "[r]esearch suggests that domestic violence
occurs in same-sex relationships with the same statistical frequency as in
opposite-sex relationships."57 The corresponding footnote explains that
"[s]tudies report ... that twenty-five percent of lesbians and twenty-
seven percent of heterosexual women admit being physically abused by
their partners in committed relationships."58 In addition to citing differ-
ent figures from the same page of Renzetti's previously discussed article,
this article refers to "studies" when these percentages are derived from
only one study.59
In addition, many of the studies reviewed by Renzetti, and
subsequently cited in legal articles, have their own methodological
problems which Renzetti does not fully explore. For example, studies of
smaller samples where the women were located through word of mouth
("snowball sampling") yield higher rates of domestic violence than
60
studies of larger samples conducted through national surveys. In
general, larger samples, because of the diversity of participants, are more
61likely to be representative and accurate. In addition, snowball
sampling62 can create bias if participants, in an attempt to be helpful,
refer the researcher to other lesbians with a known history of domestic
abuse. Further, some of the studies which Renzetti cites did not
57. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 340.
58. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 340.
59. See RENzETr, supra note 34, at 18 (summarizing the methodology and results of the
PA. Brand and A.H. Kidd study, Frequency of PhysicalAggression in Heterosexual and
Female HomosexualDyads, 59 PSYCHOL. REP. 1307 (1986)).
60. See RENZETI, supra note 34, at 17-18. The ratio of sample size to frequency of vio-
lence in the studies that Renzetti cites is as follows: (1) in a sample of 48 lesbians, 95
percent had "used verbal abuse tactics" and forty-seven percent had "used physical
aggression;" (2) in a sample of 169 lesbians, 73.4 percent "reported experiencing acts
defined as physically, sexually, or verbally/emotionally aggressive;" (3) in a sample of
174 lesbians, 59.8 percent had experienced physical violence and eighty-one percent
had experienced verbal or emotional abuse; (4) in a sample of 90 lesbian couples,
46.6 percent were violent; and (5) in a sample of 1,566 lesbians, 17 percent had ex-
perienced domestic abuse.
61. See RODNEY STARK & LYNNrE ROBERTS, CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS
194 (1996).
62. STARK & ROBERTS, supra note 61, at 90. A snowball sample is "assembled by referral,
as persons having the characteristic(s) of interest identify others."
63. See Burke & Follingstad, supra note 29, at 500 (discussing bias in small samples).
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exclude force used in self-defense,"' which likely inflated the reported
prevalence of abuse.
Legal scholars' often matter-of-fact assertions of equal frequencies
of same-gender and opposite-gender abuse are not well substantiated,
especially when lesbian and gay male domestic violence are considered
separately, as the next section indicates.
C Failure to Distinguish Between Female-on-Female and
Male-on-Male Domestic Violence
While some legal scholarship on same-gender domestic violence fo-
cuses on lesbian65 abuse, most considers same-gender domestic violence
generally. Typically, a legal article would refer to same-gender domestic
violence generally, but then cite to a study focusing on domestic vio-
lence only in lesbian couples or only in gay male couples. As a result,
legal scholarship does not sufficiently address the differences between
lesbian and gay male domestic violence, in terms of both prevalence and
dynamics.
1. Prevalence
In describing the prevalence of domestic violence in lesbian and
gay male relationships, most legal scholarship reports the frequency of
same-gender domestic violence generally, but cites to studies that found
differences in the rate of female-on-female and male-on-male domestic
violence. For example, one article cites a study of gay male domestic
violence as supporting the statement that "[e]stimates set same-sex part-
ner abuse" between twenty and fifty percent." Similarly, one article
which relies on Men Who Beat the Men Who Love Them to support the
claim of equal rates of opposite-gender and same-gender violence notes
only in a footnote that Island and Letellier assume different rates of fe-
male-on-female and male-on-male domestic violence.67 Another article
64. See G. Lie & S. Gentlewainer, Intimate Violence in Lesbian Relationships: Discussion of
Survey Findings and Practice Implications, 15 J. oF Soc. SFRV. REs. 41 (1991); Gwat-
Yong Lie, Rebecca Schlitt, Judy Bush, M. Montagne, & Lynn Reyes, Lesbians in Cur-
rently Aggressive Relationships: How Frequently Do They Report Aggressive Past
Relationships?, 6 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 121 (1991).
65. See Robson, supra note 2; Dupps, supra note 2.
66. da Luz, supra note 2, at 268 (emphasis added).
67. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 592.
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juxtaposes the seemingly contradictory assertions that the incidence of
gay male domestic violence and the incidence of lesbian domestic vio-
lence are both equivalent to the incidence of male-on-female domestic
violence and yet also different from one another.68 A third article asserts
that "[m]ost researchers agree that the incidence of battering in lesbian
and gay couples is about the same as it is for heterosexual couples-and
that the figures may be higher for gay men than for lesbians."69
Conversely, even legal articles which cite studies reviewed by Ren-
zetti avoid mentioning one unpublished study summarized in Violent
Betrayal, which found less domestic violence in lesbian couples than in
gay male couples. 70 Even though the sample size was small-forty-eight
lesbians and fifty gay men-a statistically significant 7' difference be-
tween lesbian and gay male responses emerged: the women were less
physically abusive towards their partners than the men.72 Similarly, a
1994 study of 706 lesbian couples and 560 gay couples that is never
mentioned in the legal scholarship 73 reported a statistically significant
difference between the frequency of violence in lesbian and gay male
68. Bricker, supra note 1, at 1388 (writing that same-gender domestic violence "occurs at
the same rate as it occurs in heterosexual households" and then noting in the next
sentence that "[tihere is some evidence that violence may occur with more frequency
between gay men than between lesbians").
69. Lundy, supra note t, at 277.
70. E.E. Kelly and L. Warshafsky, Partner Abuse in Gay Male and Lesbian Couples (July
1987) (unpublished paper cited in RENzEirr, supra note 34, at 17).
71. Statistical significance does not refer to the strength of the relationship, but rather to
the likelihood that the relationship was caused by random variables or fluctuations.
Technically, statistical significance is "a calculation of the odds that a difference or
correlation is produced by random fluctuations between the sample and the popula-
tion, between the parameter [the true value of the variable in the population] and the
statistic [the observed value of the variable within a sample of the population]."
STARK & ROBERTS, supra note 61, at 71. Generally in social science, in order to be
considered statistically significant, the odds must be no greater than 1 in 20 that the
relationship is random, although many social scientists are stricter and will ignore any
relationship if the probability that the results are random is greater than 1 in 100.
STARK & ROBERTS, supra note 61, at 71. The smaller the sample size, the more diffi-
cult it is to obtain statistically significant results. STARK & ROBERTS, supra note 61, at
71.
72. Of course, this one study is no more conclusive than any other single study. How-
ever, it does seem significant that legal scholarship that advocates the non-gendered
model of domestic violence and cites to Renzetti fails to discuss this study.
73. This study was conducted after VIOLENT BETRAYAL-but still before much of the
legal scholarship-was published.
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couples: eleven percent of gay male couples and seven percent of lesbian
couples reported physical abuse.7
Another annual study that is only found in very recent legal schol-
arship is conducted by the National Coalition of Anti-Violence
Programs ("NCADV"), an organization of twenty-five gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, and transgender("GLBT") victim advocacy programs that tracks
violence against and within the GLBT community. The NCADV be-
gan issuing its Annual Report on Lesbian, Gay, BisexuaZ and Transgender
Domestic Violence, which contains it findings, in 1997. The one legal
article which cites the NCADV report distinguishes it from non-
empirical or anecdotal studies,76 despite the NCADV's warnings to in-
terpret the study "cautiously:"
Because the data collection method used was self-reporting,
not random sampling, these findings, while suggestive, are not
generalizable .... [It must be reiterated that NCAVP mem-
bers respond to geographic areas in which only 20% of the
nation's population resides. Thus, a full 80% of the nation's
population remains unaccounted for.
The NCADV report indicates that of 3,327 cases of domestic vio-
lence reported in 1997 from a sample of twelve cities, 1581 (47.5
percent) were "female cases" and 1,746 (52.5 percent) were "male
cases."' These percentages seem to indicate equivalent rates of female-
on-female and male-on-male domestic violence. However, "female
cases" refer to a female victim, not necessarily a female abuser.78 Since
the report includes domestic abuse of bisexual women, r9 some incidents
74. A. Steven Bryant & Demian, Relationship Characteristics ofAmerican Gay and Lesbian
Couples: Findings from a National Survey, 1 J. GAY & LESBIAN Soc. SERV. 101, 112
(1994).
75. See What is NCA VP?, ANruAL REPORT ON LESBIAN, GAY, BisExuAL, AND TRANSGEN-
DER DOMEsTIc VIOLENCE, Oct. 6, 1998, at 1.
76. Knauer, supra note 2, at 328-29. Knauer characterizes Renzetti and Island & Letel-
lier by stating that "not one represents a broad-based empirical study," but then cites
newspaper articles referring to the NCADV study for her assertion that "one thing
that does seem clear is that same-sex domestic violence occurs with the same fre-
quency as opposite-sex domestic violence." Knauer, supra note 2, at 328-29.
77. See The Prevalence of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Domestic Violence
[hereinafter Prevalence], ANNUAL REPORT ON LESBIAN, GAY, BIsExuAL, AND TRANS-
GENDER DOMEsTmic VIOLENCE, Oct. 6, 1998, at 4.
78. See Prevalence, supra note 77, at 3.
79. Two of the surveyed organizations which contributed data explicitly served lesbians
and bisexual women-the San Francisco Network for Battered Lesbians and Bisexual
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of male-on-female domestic violence were likely included in "female
,,80
cases.
But even more significantly, of the twenty-four organizations con-
tributing data to the study, six serve only women."' Thus, all incidents
of abuse reported by these organizations involved female victims
(although not necessarily female abusers). For example, in Little Rock,
Arkansas, where only the Women's Project contributed data,s2 100 per-
cent of the domestic violence reported involved female victims."
Likewise, in Boston, Massachusetts, where one of three surveyed organi-
zations was The Network for Battered Lesbians and Bisexual Women, 4
78.7 percent of the domestic violence cases involved female victims.85
Conversely, in Chicago, Illinois, where none of the organizations focus




Most legal articles compare and contrast the dynamics of male-on-
female domestic violence with same-gender domestic violence and con-
clude that the dynamics are almost indistinguishable-with the
exception of homophobia. 8 Undoubtedly, homophobia amplifies the
Women and The Network for Battered Lesbians and Bisexual Women. See Preva-
lence, supra note 77, at 4.
80. There could also be female-on-male domestic violence included in the "male cases"
category. However, since ninety-five percent of domestic violence victims are women,
see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTI E, BuREAu OF JusncE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION
ON CRIME AND JusTICE: THE DATA 21 (1983), the number of incidents reported by
bisexual men who were abused by women would likely have been significantly less
than the number reported by bisexual women.
81. These organizations are: Women's Project (AK); Asian Women's Shelter (CA); San
Francisco Network for Battered Lesbians and Bisexual Women (CA); W.O.M.AN.,
Inc. (CA); YWCA Women's Services Center (CA); and The Network for Battered
Lesbian and Bisexual Women (MA).
82. See Appendix A: NCA VP Member Organizations and Affiliates Who Contributed Data
to This Report [hereinafter Appendix], ANNUAL REPORT ON LESBIAN, GAY, BIsEXUAL,
AND TRANSGENDER DOMEsTIc VIOLENCE, Oct. 6, 1998, at 20.
83. See Prevalence, supra note 77, at 4.
84. See Appendix, supra note 82, at 21, 24.
85. See Prevalence, supra note 77, at 4.
86. See Appendix, supra note 82, at 21.
87. See Prevalence, supra note 77, at 4.
88. Duthu, supra note 2, at 30-33 ("With the exception of a few important differences,
the dynamics of lesbian and gay domestic violence are very similar to the dynamics of
male-to-female battering.... Use of homophobia is the crucial difference between
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effects of domestic violence in numerous ways: by increasing the sense
of isolation felt by the victim; by internalizing homophobia which "may
lead one to become rigidly defensive about one's [lesbian orientation]
and thus susceptible to denying [intra-lesbian domestic] violence even
when witnessed or experienced;"" or by enabling the abuser to use
threats of disclosing the victim's sexual orientation.0 However, research-
ers have also identified additional dynamics of domestic violence which
are not equally common to both lesbian and gay male couples, such as
(1) HIV status for gay male couples; and (2) butch-femme relations9' for
lesbian couples.92 Neither of these dynamics are discussed in legal schol-
arship.
Island and Letellier explain that "for many gay men involved with
violent partners, AIDS adds tremendous complications to their relation-
ships."" They remark that gay men whose batterers are HIV positive
gay and lesbian domestic violence and heterosexual domestic violence."); Goldfarb,
supra note 2, at 612-13 (discussing lack of means of legal redress available to same-
sex victims of domestic abuse); Knauer, supra note 2, at 337 (referring to homopho-
bia and the threat of disclosing the victim's sexual orientation as "a form of abuse that
is without heterosexual equivalent") (citations omitted); Lundy, supra note t, at 281,
282 ("mhe dynamics of lesbian and gay domestic violence are very similar to the
dynamics of male-to-female battering... Yet [there is] a crucial difference that in-
creases the vulnerability of gay men and lesbians to domestic abuse: homophobia and
its attendant isolation."); da Luz, supra note 2, at 268-72 (discussing role of homo-
phobia in explaining the gay and lesbian communities' lack of acknowledgement of
same-sex domestic abuse); Dupps, supra note 2, at 898 ("Homophobia also increases
the isolation of battered lesbians . . ."); Murphy, supra note 2, at 341 (explaining that
"while all victims of domestic violence experience feelings of isolation and helpless-
ness, abused same-sex partners are even further isolated. Same-sex abusers often use
the threat of exposure or 'outing' as a means of repression and control.").
89. Robson, supra note 2, at 581.
90. See generally, Mindy Benowitz, How Homophobia Affects Lesbians'Response to Violence
in Lesbian Relationships, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OuT ABoUT LESBIAN
BATrEING 198 (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986).
91. Inclusion of this discussion about domestic violence in butch-femme couples is not
meant to imply or suggest that female-on-female domestic violence was ever confined
to butch-femme relationships, or that all butch-femme couples are violent. Rather,
this section describes one lesbian relationship dynamic that has no gay male analogue,
and considers how this dynamic affects lesbian domestic violence in certain contexts.
92. Researchers have also studied relationship quality, substance and alcohol abuse,
physical and sexual abuse in family of origin, levels of dependency and autonomy,
and power imbalances in both lesbian and gay male relationships. See Carolyn M.
West, Leaving a Second Closet: Outing Partner Abuse in Same-Sex Couples, in PARTNER
VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF 20 YEARS OF RESEARCH 163, 171-78
(Jana L. Jasinki & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998) (summarizing research on the
"correlates of same-sex partner violence").
93. ISLAND & LETELLIER, supra note 17, at 251.
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will experience even greater difficulty leaving because of guilt and com-
munity disbelief that an HIV positive man would possess the strength to
be abusive.94 Another researcher reports that:
If a batterer is HIV positive, he may threaten to infect his vic-
tim or use his failing health to make the victim feel guilty
about leaving the abusive situation .... Alternatively, if the
victim has been infected with HIV, the batterer may threaten
to withhold medical care or to reveal the victim's HIV-positive
status, which may result in discrimination and the loss of in-
come or insurance benefits."
While HIV status can be a significant dynamic in abusive gay male
relationships, it is not as likely to be a significant dynamic in abusive
lesbian relationships96 because of the lower rates of HIV infection
among lesbians."
Since the legal scholarship on same-gender intimate abuse
primarily advocates a non-gendered model of domestic violence, most
articles do not consider gendering an abuser "masculine" and a victim
"feminine." Those articles which do discuss this categorization dismisses
it outright as "heteronormative, " " or "at best a misdescription.
"99
94. ISLAND & LETELLIER, supra note 17, at 251.
95. See West, supra note 92, at 170.
96. See Bryant & Demian, supra note 74, at 113-14 (finding that AIDS had a greater
influence on the dynamics of gay male couples than lesbian couples).
97. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, HIVAIDS & U.S. Women Who
Have Sex With Women [hereinafter "WSW"] at http://www.cdc.govlhiv/pubs/facts/
wsw.htm (last modified Aug. 1999). According to the CDC:
Through December 1998, 109,311 women were reported with AIDS. Of
these, 2,220 were reported to have had sex with women; however, the vast
majority had other risks (such as injection drug use, sex with high-risk
men, or receipt of blood or blood products). Of the 347 (out of 2,220)
women who were reported to have had sex only with women, 98% also
had another risk-injection drug use in most cases .... As of December
1998, none of these investigations had confirmed female-to-female HIV
transmission....
WSW, supra. In contrast, the CDC reports that in 1997 almost 125,000 gay and bi-
sexual men were living with AIDS in the U.S. See CDC, Need for Sustained HIV
Prevention Among Men who Have Sex with Men http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/
msm.htm (last modified Jan. 31, 2000).
98. See Eaton, supra note 26, at 207.
99. See Knauer, supra note 2, at 336 ("Leaving aside the contemporary resurgence of
gender play within the lesbian communities, the continued reliance on gender seems
at best a misdescription.").
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However, there is historical evidence of some "butch" lesbians, who
assumed a masculine gender image, abusing some "femme" lesbians,
who assumed a feminine gender image.100 Rather than avoiding this
evidence or using it to lend credence to the claim that lesbians relegate
all domestic violence to maleness and masculine women, scholars need
to consider the historical reality of butch-femme identities and how
lesbian feminism grew out of the butch-femme tradition. Only through
such consideration can scholars ascertain what effect the initial denial of
non-butch-femme domestic violence has had on the lesbian community's
reaction to female-on-female domestic violence.
Abusive butch-femme relationships provide a unique opportunity
to understand the extent to which masculine-on-feminine violence can
exist in lesbian couples.10' Although the only study of butch-femme dy-
namics and domestic violence is historical, butch-femme continues to
be a central schema for a sizable minority of the modern lesbian com-
munity.102 While historians found no evidence of femme lesbians
initiating domestic violence against their butch partners, they discovered
that "[b] ecause this community was not completely tied into the domi-
nant system of heterosexual male supremacy, violence did not function
100. See ELIZABETH LAPOVSKY KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAvis, BooTs OF LEATHER,
SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY 316-322 (1993)
(documenting the pre-Stonewall working-class lesbian community in Buffalo, NY).
101. See KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 100, at 316. Kennedy and Davis remark:
On the one hand, butches hitting fems evokes everything that is wrong
with male supremacy. It has been the quintessential example for contem-
porary feminists of why this gendered lesbian culture has nothing to offer
and should be dismissed from our heritage. On the other hand, once we
digest the evidence that such physical abuse occurred in a limited historical
period of butch-fern culture, under specific social conditions, this history
opens up new perspectives on the complex connections among gender,
power and violence.
KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 100, at 316.
102. See Teresa Scherzer, Domestic Violence in Lesbian Relationships: Findings of the Lesbian Rela-
tionhps Research Project, in GATEWAYS TO IMPROVING LESBIAN HEALTH AND HF.mTH
CARE: OPENING DOORS 29, 37-38 (Christy M. Ponticelli ed., 1998) (reporting that
twenty-nine percent of lesbian respondents claimed a "role identification" of either butch or
femme). See also Sue-Ellen Case, Towards a Butch-Femme Aesthetic, in THE LESBIAN AND
GAY STUDIES READER 294 (Abelove et al. eds., 1993); THE FEMME MYSTIQUE (Leslea
Newman ed., 1995); JoAN NESTLE, THE PERIsTENmr DEsiRE: A FFimME-BUTrcH READER
(1992). See also, Amy Goodloe, Lesbian Identity and the Politics of Butch Femme (visited
June 3, 2000) <http://www.lesbian.org/amy/essays/bf-paper.htnl>; Butch-Femme.com
(visited June 3, 2000) <http://www.butch-femme.com>; Butch-Femme Penonals (visited




in lesbian relationships in the same way as in heterosexual relation-
ships."' 03 First, violence was not as long-lasting; most femmes left an
abusive relationship within one to three years.'O There was very little
social support or pressure for the continuation of a relationship."' Fur-
ther, most of the femme women supported themselves (and sometimes
their partners) economically and so were not precluded from leaving by
financial constraints. '6 It was also considered unlikely that an abusive
butch woman would stalk or harass a partner who left, since
"community values and institutions emphasized the excitement of a new
romance, rather than the necessity of continuing the old."0 7 Second, the
controlling effect of the physical violence was truncated:
Most important, the use of violence by butches was not a se-
cret. At this time, fems were neither isolated in their
relationships nor ashamed of the violence. Most fems talked
with others about violence and did not live under the threat of
serious repercussion should they tell the truth; the "truth" was
known. Since people went out regularly, any serious violence
in the home was apparent to the community. Many fights
actually took place in public, in the bars. Not only were there
witnesses, but also observers would usually step in and inter-
rupt a fight that got too bad.'0 8
One implication of considering the dynamics of butch-on-femme
domestic violence is that, "ironically, lesbian-feminist culture of the
1970s, by adopting the ideology that only men were violent, created an
atmosphere in which violence in lesbian relationships needed to be kept
a secret and many women lost the protection of community limita-
tion."'09
Legal scholars' support for the non-gendered model of domestic
violence, and concomitant assertions of parallel rates and dynamics of
103. KENNEDY & DAvis, supra note 100, at 319. There were similarities to modern male-
on-female abuse, however, including self-defense and fighting back by femme women
and the exacerbating role of alcohol.
104. KENNEDY & DAviS, supra note 100, at 318.
105. KENNEDY & DAvis, supra note 100, at 319 ("both butch and fem knew the relation-
ship would not last forever").
106. See KENNEDY & DAviS, supra note 100, at 319.
107. KENNEDY & DAvis, supra note 100, at 319.
108. KENNEDY& DAvis, supra note 100, at 319.
109. KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 100, at 319; cf KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 100, at
421 ("[B]utch narrators ... feel that today there is a lot of verbal abuse that goes un-
noticed. They also suspect hidden physical violence in relationships.").
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lesbian and gay male domestic violence, can be challenged not only
through careful examination of statistical and historical data, but also
through scrutiny of the research instruments used to gauge rates of do-
mestic violence, as the next section indicates.
D. Measurement Validity
In arguing for the non-gendered model of domestic violence, legal
scholars assume equivalent rates of male-on-male, male-on-female, fe-
male-on-female, and female-on-male1 abuse"'-a difficult assumption
to prove given the wide-spread criticism and rebuttal of those studies
which allegedly indicate that in the heterosexual context female-on-male
abuse is as prevalent as male-on-female abuse. Most of this criticism
focuses on the Conflict Tactics Scale ("CTS"), an instrument used to
determine the frequency of subjects' use of violence to resolve inter-
family conflicts. In addition to being used to demonstrate analogous
rates of "husband abuse," the CTS has been utilized in studies of same-
gender domestic violence. While some of these studies are cited in legal
scholarship on same-gender domestic violence, no discussion of the
flaws or bias associated with the CTS is included.
1. The Conflict Tactics Scale
The CTS "is designed to measure a variety of behaviors used in
conflicts between family members."" 2 It consists of approximately 18
110. Presumably, a non-gendered model of domestic violence would also posit equal fre-
quencies of domestic violence perpetrated by and against transgender individuals.
111. By definition, the non-gendered model expects parallel rates of domestic violence
regardless of the gender of the abuser and victim. In a confusing inversion of this
logic, however, some legal scholarship contains contradictory assertions that domestic
violence is gender-neutral, but men batter women much more than women batter
men. Compare da Luz, supra note 2, at 252 ("The most prevalent form of domestic
violence is abuse committed by a man against a woman, often his wife.") with da Luz,
supra note 2, at 252 ("[Tlhis Article assumes that partner abuse and its effects are not
gender-specific."). See also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing as-
sertions that domestic violence is gender-neutral combined with reports of different
rates of female-on-female and male-on-male abuse).
112. Murray A. Straus, The National Family Violence Surveys, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE N
AMERICAN FAMILIEs: RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMi-




questions, n3 focusing on the frequency of various methods or tactics
utilized to resolve conflicts during a certain retrospective time period.
The questions begin with "Reasoning" tactics, then "Verbal Aggression"
tactics, and "Violence" tactics; the latter are subdivided into "Minor"
and "Severe" violence."' The first question is a rational discussion tactic,
"discussed an issue calmly," which is considered the least coercive, and
the last question is a violence tactic, "used a knife or fired a gun," which
is considered the most coercive. n 5
In 1975 and 1985, Murray A. Straus and Richard J. Gelles con-
ducted national CTS telephone surveys of 8,145 households to
determine frequencies of domestic violence and child abuse.1 16 Accord-
ing to both surveys, women and men utilize violent tactics at similar
rates:
Of those couples reporting any violence, 49 percent were
situations... where both were violent .... [A] comparison of
the number of couples in which only the husband was violent
with those in which only the wife was violent shows the fig-
ures to be very close: 27 percent violent husbands and 24
percent violent wives.1 7 (1975 survey)
The rate of 116 per 1,000 couples shows that almost 1 out of
8 husbands carried out 1 or more violent acts during the year
of this study .... [T]he rates for violence by wives are re-
markably similar [124 per 1,000 couples].' 18 (1985 survey)
113. See Murray A. Straus, Measuring Intrafamily Conflict and Violence: The Conflict Tac-
tics (C) Scales, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 112, at 32-33 (displaying CIS
"Couple Form R7). Since the CTS measures partner abuse and child abuse, there is
more than one version. Also, the CTS is not copyrighted, and Straus allows research-
ers to create modified versions by adding additional questions. See Murray A. Straus,
The Conflict Tactics Scale and Its Critics: An Evaluation and New Data on Validity and
Reliability, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 112, at 57.
114. See Murray A. Straus, The National Family Violence Surveys, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE,
supra note 112, at 5-6.
115. See Murray A. Straus, Measui ing Intrafamily Conflict and Violence, in PHYSICAL Vio-
LENCE, supra note 112, at 33 (displaying CTS "Couple Form R").
116. See BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (Murray A. Straus
et al. eds., 1980) (reporting and discussing the results of the 1975 survey); Straus &
Gelles, supra note 26 (reporting and discussing the results of the 1985 survey).
117. Straus & Gelles, supra note 26, at 37.
118. Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles, How Violent Are American Families? Estimates
ftom the National Family Violence Resurvey and Other Studies, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE,
supra note 112, at 96-97.
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Other surveys using the CTS have also found parallel rates of fe-
male-on-male and male-on-female violence." 9
The CTS is widely criticized and characterized as an instrument
which yields gender-biased results. For example, studies of couples in
which both parties answered the CTS revealed that men underreport
their own violent tactics.120 The two national surveys mentioned previ-
ously only interviewed one person per couple, as did many subsequent
replication studies.' 21 In addition, the CTS only measures violent acts,
not injuries'2 or other consequences of the violence," and does not
consider whether violent tactics were used in self-defense. 2 4 Moreover,
in order to reach the conclusion that the "causal accounts of violence
will be gender-blind," 25 the CTS has to ignore most contextual factors
surrounding the abuse: 26
To illustrate our point further, we take a fictitious case in-
volving a mother with three children. Her husband works for
an accounting firm, and she is a homemaker. She has twice
been hospitalized as a result of his abuse. One night he comes
home late and drunk. She begins to raise her voice and call
him names. He starts to walk toward her; she tells him not to
touch her. He smiles and continues toward her. She throws a
119. See, e.g., Russell P. Dobash et al., The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence,
39:1 SoC. PROB. 71, 73 (1992) (citing multiple replication studies).
120. See Ernest N. Jouriles & K Daniel O'Leary, Interspousal Reliability of Reports of
Marital Violence, 53:3 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 419 (1985); Maximil-
lane E. Szinovacz, Using Couple Data as a Methodological Tool The Case of Marital
Violence, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 633 (1983).
121. See Jouriles & O'Leary, supra note 120, at 219 ("Many researchers have relied on
retrospective reports of a single spouse for their data on the incidence and frequency
of relationship violence.").
122. See, e.g., Wini Breines & Linda Gordon, The New Scholarship on Family Violence, 8:3
SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOc'Y 490, 512 (1983).
123. See Nancy R. Rhodes, The Assessment of Spousal Abuse: An Alternative to the Conflict
Tactics Scale, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIvEs 27, 29
(Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992) ("Violent encounters vary greatly in the types of actions,
the intensity of those actions, and the nature of the short- and long-term conse-
quences. The degree of physical danger and continuing psychological trauma is an
important indicator of intensity, and this is not adequately captured on the CTS.").
124. See Daniel G. Saunders, When Battered Women Use Violence: Husband-Abuse or Self-
Defense?, 1 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 47 (1986).
125. Dobash et al., supra note 119, at 74.
126. See Kathleen J. Ferraro & John M. Johnson, How Women Experience Battering: The
Process of Victimization, 30 Soc. PROBLEMS 325, 325 (1983) ("The scale is not de-




vase at him, and it hits him in the arm. He grabs her by the
hair and tells her that if she doesn't shut up, he will smash her
face. So far, it's 1:2 on the CTS. She then kicks him hard in
the shins. It's now 2:2. He pounds her head into the wall sev-
eral times, and she reaches out and scratches his face. He lets
go, and she runs out of the house and goes to her sister's house
for the next three days. It's 3:3 on the CTS .
Similarly, the CTS is criticized because of its assumption that vio-
lence stems from conflict rather than issues of power and control.
Further, the CTS contains no mechanism for measuring or ac-
counting for gender role assumptions of the subjects. Thus, it is possible
that violent tactics by a man could easily be forgotten if one generally
believed that male violence was intrinsic or normative, while equally
violent behavior by a woman could be so shockingly unexpected that it
is remembered and reported. 29 Likewise, the very language of some of
the questions seems to be targeting women. For example, three ques-
tions ask if the subject ever "sulked," "stomped out," or (ccried."13O
Women could conceivably answer affirmatively more often than men.
simply because of the stereotypically feminine characterization of the
tactic. At the very least, these questions are more prone to subjective
interpretation than other questions which inquire about very specific
acts (e.g. "used a knife or fired a gun").' 3'
127. Tineke Ritmeester & Ellen Pence, A Cynical Twist of Fate: How Processes of Ruling in
the Criminal Justice System and the Social Sciences Impede Justice for Battered Women, 2
S. CAL. REV. & WOMEN'S STUD. 255, 277 (1992).
128. See Kersti A. Yo, Through a Feminist Lens: Gender, Power, and Violence, in CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 47, 53 (Richard J. Gelles & Donileen R.
Loske eds., 1993). Yllo explains that:
Gelles and Straus themselves recognize that "over and over again, case after
case, interview after interview, we hear batterers and victims discuss how
power and control were at the core of events that led up to the use of violence."
Yet these core elements are missing in the "conflicts of personal interests"
approach to measuring violence.
Yllo, supra at 53 (citations omitted).
129. See Breines & Gordon, supra note 122, at 512.
130. Murray A. Straus, Measuring Intrafamily Conflict and Violence: The conflict Tactics
(CT) Scales, in PRYSICAL VIOLENCE, supra note 112, at 33 (Figure 3.1).
131. See generally Rhodes, supra note 123, at 29 (criticizing the CTS for its lack of uni-
formity).
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2. Studies of Same-Gender Domestic Violence Using the CTS
While the legal scholarship on same-gender domestic violence
does not include affirmations of the CTS, many of the cited studies of
same-gender abuse utilize the CTS.' 32 As described previously, re-
search on same-gender domestic violence has reported prevalence rates
ranging from four to ninety-five percent.133 However, studies that
utilize a form of the CTS reveal prevalence rates of thirty-one to sixty-
seven percent for lesbians'm and twenty-five to thirty-eight percent
for gay men,135 while studies which rely on an instrument other
than the CTS found lower rates of domestic violence: four
to twenty-five percent for lesbians"6  and eleven percent for
132. See, e.g., Lundy, supra note t, at 277 (citing studies reviewed by Renzetti); Murphy,
supra note 2, at 340 (citing studies reviewed by Renzetti). Four of the seven studies
reviewed by Renzetti used the CTS. See Renzetti, supra note 34, at 17-18. See aso
Goldfarb, stpra note 2, at 592 (citing Jane Garcia who cites Vallerie Coleman);
Bricker, supra note 1, at 1389 (citing Vallerie Coleman); da Luz, supra note 2, at 267
(citing Jane Garcia who cites Vallerie Coleman); Murphy, supra note 2, at 340 (citing
Jane Garcia who cites Vallerie Coleman). Vallerie Coleman's study of domestic vio-
lence in 90 lesbian couples used the CTS in a modified form, which included a
question about threatening to "out" a partner's sexual orientation. See Vallerie Cole-
man, Violence in Lesbian Couples: A Between Groups Comparison, Appendix F
(1990) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, California School of Professional Psychol-
ogy).
133. See supra Part II.C. 1.
134. See M.J. Bologna, C.K. Waterman, & L.J. Dawson, Violence in Gay Male and Les-
bian Relationships: Implications for Practitioners and Policy Makers (July 1987)
(unpublished manuscript cited in RENZETTr, supra note 34, at 18) (fifty-two percent);
Coleman, supra note 132 (46.6 percent); Risa Ann Gardner, Method of Conflict
Resolution and Correlates of Physical Aggression and Victimization in Heterosexual,
Lesbian, and Gay Male Couples (1988) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univer-
sity of Georgia) (forty-eight percent); G. Lie et al., supra note 64, at 46 (fifty
percent); L.L. Lockhart, B.A. White, V. Causby, and A. Isaac, Letting Out the Secret:
Violence in Lesbian Relationships, 9 J. INTERERSONAL VIOLENCE 469 (1994) (thirty-
one percent); Scherzer, supra note 102, at 40 (Christy M. Ponticelli ed., 1998) (sixty-
seven percent); Lisa K. Waldner-Haugrud, Linda Vaden Gratch, & Brian Magruder,
Victimization and Perpetration Rates of Violence and Gay and Lesbian Relationships:
Gender Issues Explored, 12:2 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 173, 178 (1997) (forty-eight per-
cent).
135. See Bologna et al., supra note 134 (twenty-five percent); Gardner, supra note 134
(thirty-eight percent); Waldner-Haugrud et al., supra note 134, at 178 (29.7 per-
cent).
136. See Judith Bradford, Caitlin Ryan, & Esther D. Rothblum, National Lesbian Health
Care Survey: Implications for Mental Health Care, 62:2 J. CLINICAL & CONSULTING
PSYCHOL. 228, 232 (1994) (sixteen percent); Pamela A. Brand and Aline H. Kidd,
Frequency of Physical Aggression in Heterosexual and Female Homosexual Dyads, 59
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gay men."' Thus, use of the CTS seems to result in higher reports of
same-gender domestic violence generally, with lesbians reporting more
domestic violence than gay men. This pattern is similar to results from
studies which found gender bias when researchers used the CTS to as-
sess heterosexual abuse-men tend to underreport their use of violence,
while women tend to inflate their use of violence.138
While legal scholarship does not include citations to many of these
studies, the studies which are cited tend to be those which utilize the
CTS.13 9 But even without this direct link, by advocating a non-gendered
model of domestic violence legal scholars are aligning themselves with
others who advocate the same model-including Straus and Gelles.
This legal scholarship is assuming a stance contrary to that of most so-
cial scientists, which if continued could result in a schism between legal
perceptions of same-gender domestic violence and scientific paradigms.
II. PRAGMATIC IMPLICATIONS: MANDATORY ARREST LAws
In relying on the non-gendered model of abuse, legal scholarship
on same-gender domestic violence is not only advocating a questionable
theoretical model, but also lending credence to problematic legal poli-
cies, such as mandatory arrest,40 which rely on a non-gendered and
PSYCHOL. REP. 1307, at 1311 (1986) (twenty-five percent); Bryant & Demian, supra
note 74, at 112 (seven percent); JOANN LouLAN, LESBIAN PASSION 187 (1987)
(reporting that of 1566 lesbians surveyed thirteen percent had been abused by a
"female loverlfriend" and four percent had been abused by a "female mate").
137. See Bryant & Demian, supra note 74, at 112 (eleven percent).
138. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 132.
140. Currently, at least twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have some form
of a mandatory arrest statute. See Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 B; COLO. REV.
STAT § 18-6-803.6 (Supp. 1996) (mandatory arrest when officer has probable cause
that any crime against a person or felony crime against property has occurred); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b (West 1993) (mandatory arrest when a crime of family
violence has occurred); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031(a)(1) (Supp. 1993) (mandatory
arrest when officer has probable cause that violence occurred); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 709-906(4); IowA CODE ANN. § 236.12; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403-760(2)
(Baldwin Supp. 1992) (mandatory arrest when officer has probable cause of a pro-
tection order violation); La. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1) (West 1993) (mandatory
arrest when officer has probable cause of aggravated battery or reasonable belief that
family abuse occurred); ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5) (West 1981 & Supp.
1993) (mandatory arrest when officer has probable cause that domestic violence oc-
curred); MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 209A § 6 (Law. Co-op 1981 & Supp. 1992)
(mandatory arrest when officer has reason to believe that family abuse or violation of
a protection order occurred); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01.14-(b) (West 1990 &
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decontextualized understanding of domestic violence. Mandatory arrest
laws require police officers in domestic violence situations to arrest any-
one for whom they have probable cause to believe assaulted his or her
partner.' 41 Just like the CTS, mandatory arrest policies often do not suf-
ficiently consider the context surrounding the violence, including a
prior history of abuse or whether force was used in self-defense.' In-
stead, police officers are obligated to arrest anyone who used violence,
even if they did not cause any injury or were acting only in self-
defense. 1
Supp. 1993) (mandatory arrest when officer has probable cause of protection order
violation); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(2) (Vernon's 1993) (mandatory arrest when
there is abuse in violation of a protection order); NEB. REy. STAT. § 42-928 (1992)
(mandatory arrest based on violation of a protection order); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 171.137 (Michie 1992) (mandatory arrest when officer has probable cause that
battery has been committed within preceding four hours unless there are mitigating
circumstances); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2c:25-21(a)(1-3) (West 1993) (mandatory arrest
when officer has probable cause of physical injury, protection order violation, or ar-
rest warrant); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(c) (Michie 1993) (mandatory arrest for
protection order violation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(b) (1989) (mandatory arrest
when officer has probable cause of protection order violation); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 40.3(B) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (mandatory arrest when officer observes a
recent physical injury); OR REv. STAT. 5 133.055(2) (1991) (mandatory arrest when
officer has probable cause of protection order violation); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6113(a) (1991) (mandatory arrest when officer has probable cause of protection
order violation); I. GEN. LAws § 12-29-3; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-
2.1(2) (1993) (mandatory arrest when officer has probable cause that violence oc-
curred or of protection order violation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-61 l(a)(2) (1991)
(mandatory arrest when officer has reasonable cause of protection order violation);
TEx. Fm. CODE ANN. § 14.03(b) (West Supp. 1993) (mandatory arrest when officer
witnesses violation of protection order); UTAH CODE ANN. §5 30-6-8, 77-36-2 (1989 &
Supp. 1993) (mandatory arrest when officer has probable cause that violence has oc-
curred or of protection order violation); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 10.31.100(2)(a-b)
(West 1990 & Supp. 1992) (mandatory arrest when officer witnesses or has probable
cause that violence occurred or of a protection order violation); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 813.125 (6)(b), 813.12(7)(b) (West 1993) (mandatory arrest when officer has
probable cause of a protection order violation or reasonable grounds to believe that
violence occurred or is likely to occur).
141. See supra note 140.
142. See generally Liza Mundy, Fault Line, THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE, Oct. 26,
1997 (following several cases of women arrested in Fairfax County, Virginia shortly
after that state's mandatory arrest law was passed).
143. Conversely, some states have pro- or presumptive-arrest laws which allow police the
discretion to arrest only the primary aggressor. See, e.g., WASH. Rav. CODE. ANN.
§ 10.31.100(2)(b) (West 1990) (amending prior law such that "mandatory arrest ap-
plies only to the primary aggressor"); see also Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for
Domestic Violence: Why It May Prove the Best First Step in Curbing Repeat Abuse,
CriM. JusT., Fall 1995, at 2, 53 (1995) ("Fewer women were inappropriately ar-
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Some legal scholarship explicitly advocates application of all do-
mestic violence provisions, including mandatory arrest policies, to
lesbian and gay male couples.145 Even without explicitly favoring man-
datory arrest policies, however, legal scholarship advocating the non-
gendered model implicitly supports legal policies and actions that fail to
consider the context surrounding incidents of domestic violence, in-
cluding gender, but also race, class, and sexual orientation of the parties,
and any history of abuse. Indeed, some supporters of the CTS argue
that prosecutors and others in the criminal justice system should utilize
the CTS in "screen[ing] cases prior to making decisions about case dis-
position" and making sentencing recommendations; 46 others have made
the CTS available to domestic violence attorneys as a tool to ascertain
"the client's involvement in marital violence [which] will probably not
be readily apparent."'47
Theoretically, it might seem that mandatory arrest policies would
reduce the possibility of discrimination because all perpetrators would
have to be arrested regardless of these social markers. But, under a
mandatory arrest policy, police officers must still make their own indi-
vidual determination of probable cause of domestic assault, and in the
rested when police were told to consider which party was the real aggressor and
which party was acting in self-defense. This worked best when primary aggressor
and/or self-defense language was both in the statute and a major component of police
training.").
144. E.g., one article does not use the term "mandatory arrest" but calls for limitations in
"the discretion of individual officers" and argues that "[laws can and should guide
police and judicial action by encouraging intervention, prosecution, and adequate
police reporting." See da Luz, supra note 2, at 289.
145. See Duthu, supra note 2, at 35 (arguing that in cases of same-gender domestic vio-
lence "officers should comply with mandatory arrest policies"); West, supra note 2, at
253 n.8 (describing mandatory arrest as "the most effective means of reducing the in-
cidence of domestic violence); da Luz, supra note 2, at 266, n.79 (characterizing
mandatory arrest laws as "advances" which "gay and lesbian victims of partner abuse
have been statutorily and socially excluded from").
146. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1573 (1998). See also Murray A. Straus,
Identifying Offenders in Criminal Justice Research on Domestic Assault, in Do ARRESTS
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 14 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996)
(suggesting that the CTS be used by the criminal justice system to classify cases of
domestic violence).
147. See K Daniel O'Leary, Assessment and Treatment of Partner Abuse: A Synopsis for the
Legal Profession, 58 ALE. L. Rav. 1215, 1233 (1995).
148. See Sarah M. Bud, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ.
213, 224 (1988) ("A mandatory arrest law can help eradicate [the] problem [of police
racism] by requiring officers to arrest whenever specific, objective conditions are met,
thus resulting in less discrimination than a discretionary system.").
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process can be effected by racism, 49 classism,"O sexism,"' and homo-
phobia.5 2 For example, although police reports indicate that women
abuse their male partners in approximately three to five percent of all
domestic violence cases,153 studies of mandatory arrest policies in various
cities indicate that women are arrested at disproportionately high rates.
The National Institute of Justice ("NIJ") studies in the early 1980s re-
vealed that in Milwaukee, Wisconsin nine percent of those arrested for
domestic violence were women; in Colorado Springs, Colorado, eleven
percent of those arrested for domestic violence were women; and in
Charlotte, North Carolina eighteen percent of those arrested for do-
mestic violence were women.
14
An independent study of arrest rates of women for domestic vio-
lence under mandatory arrest laws in Ann Arbor and Ypsilanti,
Michigan, found that 9.5 percent of those arrested for domestic violence
in Ann Arbor were women, and 15.9 percent of those arrested for do-
mestic violence in Ypsilanti were women.'55 In terms of race, 55.6
percent of female arrestees and 57.9 percent of total arrestees in Ann
149. See Andrea D. Lyon, Be Careful What You Wish For: An Examination of Arrest and
Prosecution Patterns of Domestic Violence Cases in Two Cities in Michigan, 5 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 253, 287 (1999) (finding a statistically significant difference in arrest
rates under two different arrest policies where the race of the male abuser differs from
victim); Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique ofMandatory Arrest: An Analysis
of Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. Uj. GENDER & L. 171, 198
(1994) ("Black women also suffer abuse at the hands of their husbands, but coming
face-to-face with state intervention in the form of mandatory arrest often proves more
dangerous than helpful.").
150. See Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Poli-
tics of the Battered Women's Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. GCHNE 281, 293
(1997) (explaining that "police racism and classism may operate to make them more
incredulous of the testimonies of women of color and low-income women than of
white and middle-class women, such that what is in fact a situation mandating arrest
may not be perceived as such, and vice versa") (citations omitted).
151. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
152. See Fedders, supra note 150, at 281 (observing that "the issue of sexual orientation
has been largely absent from mainstream debates on mandatory-arrest policies").
Based on the often homophobic responses of police to same-gender domestic vio-
lence, or lesbians and gay men generally, the possibility of homophobia affecting
police officers' determinations of probable cause under mandatory arrest policies is
quite high. See, e.g., Knauer, supra note 2, at 348 (discussing homophobic responses
of police to 911 calls by lesbians and gay men); Lundy, supra note t, at 290
(describing the legal system as a "nightmare for lesbian and gay people").
153. See Sherrie Bourg & Harley V. Stock, A Review of Domestic Violence in Police De-
partments Using a Pro-Arrest Policy: Are Pro-Arrest Policies Enough?, 9 J. FiM.
VIOLENCE 177-89 (1994) (cited in Zorza, supra note 143, at 9, 51).
154. Zorza, supra note 143, at 9.
155. Lyon, supra note 149, at 271.
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Arbor were either Black or Latino/a,'56 although Ann Arbor's racial mi-
nority population, according to the 1990 U.S. Census, was only
eighteen percent. 7 In Ypsilanti, 42.2 percent of female arrestees and
54.8 percent of total arrestees were Black,58 although Ypsilanti's racial
minority population was only thirty-one percent. 9 In addition, the
study found that police were less likely to arrest a woman if they were
made aware of a prior history of abuse, but were more likely to arrest a
woman if they had previously been called to her residence. 6 °
Mandatory arrest policies could quite conceivably exacerbate the
problem of dual arrests of both abuser and victim in cases of same-
gender domestic violence. Much of the legal scholarship recognizes the
difficulties caused by this misdiagnosis of mutual battering-"the idea
that most abusive intimate relationships are characterized by reciprocal
violence in which each partner is both a perpetrator and a victim of
abuse." 6' While the misdiagnosis of mutual battery is also a possibility
in heterosexual relationships-especially when instruments such as the
CTS are utilized-legal scholarship identifies it as a particular problem
for victims of same-gender domestic violence."'
156. Lyon, supra note 149, at 277.
157. Lyon, supra note 149, at 254.
158. Lyon, supra note 149, at 277.
159. Lyon, supra note 149, at 254.
160. Lyon, supra note 149, at 272.
161. RENzEmrI, supra note 34, at 107.
162. E.g., Lundy, supra note t, at 283 ("[T]he myth of mutual battering is particularly
invidious for same-sex couples, since a common misconception in both the hetero-
sexual and homosexual communities is that any violence between two men or two
women is by its very nature 'just fighting' which is actively initiated by both par-
ties."); Robson, supra note 2, at 579. Robson explains:
In the legal arena, the mutual combat concept may be more attractive in
situations where the hetero-relational factors are less evident. Many judges
and legal officials have been educated in domestic violence issues in ways
which emphasize the dominant/submissive patriarchal arrangement based
on objective criteria such as gender. When such factors are absent, judges
may be more likely to feel inadequate to determine against whom the re-
straining order should issue. In the face of such inadequacy, such judges
may either deny the restraining order or issue a mutual restraining order.
Robson, supra note 2, at 579. Further, women may be more likely to use force to
defend themselves against a female abuser than a male abuser. Compare U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR
FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 19 (1998) (reporting that thirty-
four percent of women physically defended themselves against nonlethal violence by a
male intimate; forty-three percent defended themselves by trying to escape) with
RENZETTI, supra note 34, at 110 (explaining that of 100 battered lesbians inter-
viewed, 78 defended themselves). Although the juxtaposition of these two studies
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While it might be likely that application of mandatory arrest poli-
cies to cases of same-gender domestic violence increases the likelihood
of the victim being arrested along with the abuser and functions to per-
petuate the myth of mutual battering in lesbian and gay couples, no
studies of the effects of mandatory arrest laws on same-gender domestic
violence have been conducted.'63 Given the methodological problems
associated with the studies of mandatory arrest laws,"6 and the con-
tinuing debates among social scientists about the efficacy of these
laws,' 65 the desirability of applying mandatory arrest policies to lesbian
and gay male violence-or domestic violence generally-is unclear. Yet
legal scholarship on same-gender domestic violence which advocates
mandatory arrest policies does not disclose this uncertainty, but instead
includes citations to social scientists or legal scholars who support man-
datory arrest policies,'6 without citing to opponents of mandatory arrest
laws or discussing methodological problems with studies of mandatory
arrest policies.
One legal scholar cites to the NIJ study of Minneapolis, Minne-
sota, which compared the effects of three different police responses to
proves nothing, the disparity in their findings indicates a need for a controlled study
of comparative rates of self-defense by female victims against male and female abus-
ers. Such a study could yield more reliable and generalizable findings.
163. See Fedders, supra note 150, at 281 ("[T]he issue of sexual orientation has been
largely absent from mainstream debates on mandatory-arrest policies.").
164. See, e.g., Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, The Scientific Evidence Is Not Conclusive:
Arrest Is No Panacea, in Cucr CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENcF 337, 344
(Richard J. Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993); Richard J. Gelles, Constraints
Against Family Violence: How Well Do They Work?, in Do ARRESTS AND REsTRAINING
OaRDRS Woc? 30, 34-39 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996); J. David
Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, Realities and Implications of the Charlotte Spousal
Abuse Eperiment, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS Wouc? 54, 69-80 (Eve
S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996); Dennis P. Saccuzzo, How Should the Police
Respond to Domestic Violence: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandator Ar-
rest, 39 SANTA CLAA L. Rav. 765, 773 (1999); Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W.
Sherman, Does Arrest Deter Domestic Violence?, in Do ARRESTS AND REsTRAINING
ORDERS WomK? 43, 45-48 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996); Marion
Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It
Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. Rav. 533, 556 (1996); Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest
of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem ofAbuse, 43 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1133, 1153 (1994).
165. See Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in Do ARRESTS
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 115 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,
1996).
166. See West, supra note 2, at 253 (citing three articles in support of mandatory arrest




domestic violence-arrest, mediation, and orderingi the abuser to leave
the premises for eight hours-on recidivism rates.167 Six months after
the initial police response, ten percent of those arrested, nineteen per-
cent of those who received mediation, and twenty-four percent of those
who were ordered off the premises were involved in additional incidents
of domestic violence.168 However, the researchers for this study warned
that mandatory arrest policies should not be implemented without fur-
ther study,'69 a fact not mentioned by this legal scholar. Since additional
studies have not consistently replicated the results of the Minneapolis
study,' 7"-another fact not mentioned by this legal scholar-one of the
original researchers, Professor Lawrence Sherman, has opposed manda-
tory arrest laws.'
71
Sherman, and many other social scientists, have pointed out that
the series of NIJ studies were riddled with methodological problems.'72
For example, the internal validity of the original Minneapolis study was
compromised because the assignment of cases to one of three police
responses was not entirely random.' 73 In addition, replication studies
which corrected for the internal validity problems yielded different
results-namely, that arrest did not necessarily deter future acts of
domestic violence. 74 Further, post-arrest consequences were not
167. See da Luz, supra note 2, at 266.
168. da Luz, supra note 2, citing CAL. COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT ON
VIOLENCE 10 (1993). See also Gelles, supra note 26, at 32.
169. See Schmidt & Sherman, supra note 164, at 44 ("Although the study authors op-
posed mandating arrest until further studies were completed, within 8 years
legislatures in 15 states (including 1 in which a replication was being conducted) and
the District of Columbia moved to enact [mandatory arrest] laws.").
170. Supra note 37, at 47 tbl. 4.1 (summarizing the results of the NIJ Minneapolis and
replication studies).
171. See LAWRENCE SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND
DILEMMAS 22, 253-55 (1992).
172. A complete summary of the literature on the methodological problems with the NIJ
studies is beyond the scope of this article. For a more detailed discussion see SHER-
MAN ET AL., supra note 171.
173. See Richard A. Berk & Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Responses to Family Violence
Incidents: An Analysis of an Experimental Design with Incomplete Randomization, 83 J.
Am. STAT. Ass'N, March 1988, at 70.
174. See Gelles, supra note 164, at 35 ("[The design ... attempted to correct for the
threats to the internal validity of the Minneapolis study. The major finding was...
contrary to the evidence from Minneapolis, that arrest and the immediate period of
custody associated with arrest were not a deterrent to continued domestic violence.");
Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 164, at 68 tbl.5.1 (reporting that in the Charlotte,
North Carolina replication study, there was no statistically significant difference be-
tween arrest and other police responses in deterring future acts of domestic violence).
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consistent from study to study.75 In Minneapolis, arrest were followed
by a night in jail and on average those arrested spent twenty-four hours
in police custody. By contrast, arrested abusers spent an average of only
two to sixteen hours in police custody in the replication studies.'76 The
studies also failed to consider rates of prosecution and conviction. '7
In sum, legal scholars writing about same-gender domestic violence
need to carefuly consider the shortcomings of the research on manda-
tory arrest laws-as well as the limitations of these laws and policies-
before uncritically advocating their application to lesbian and gay male
couples.
CONCLUSION
In the process of analogizing or equating same-gender domestic
violence to opposite-gender domestic violence, legal scholarship often
ignores the problematic assumptions and implications of the non-
gendered model of domestic violence. Rather than continuing to follow
the lead of legal scholars who "assume that intimate violence and its ef-
fects are not gender-specific,"' 78 legal scholarship should "advocate[] a
way of thinking and talking about intimate violence that recognizes
multiple contexts rather than an approach that simply translates the
conceptual terminology of battering into a single gender-neutral dis-
course."'79 In working towards the latter, legal scholars should carefully
scrutinize methodology and research instruments before relying on so-
cial science research, to ensure that the results are reliable and
generalizable and that sufficient attention was paid to multiple contexts
of domestic violence. Likewise, before advocating for changes in the law,
legal scholars should insist that these changes be responsive to the indi-
vidual contexts of domestic violence situations.
Although this article focuses on the shortcomings of the non-
gendered model of domestic violence, a purely gender based model is no
175. See Wanless, supra note 164, at 556.
176. See Wanless, supra note 164, at 556 (citing, Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of
Criminology on Criminal Law: Evaluating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 25).
177. See Wanless, supra note 164, at 556 (stating "[n]one of the studies evaluated the im-
pact of a comprehensive criminal justice system response-arrest, prosecution,
sentencing-on abuser recidivism.").
178. See Bricker, supra note 1, at 1383.
179. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 620.
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more satisfactory in accounting for same-gender abuse.18 Instead, mul-
tiple models should be constructed in order to convey more accurate,
nuanced, and detailed understandings of the varied contexts of domestic
violence: "Lesbians need our own conceptual paradigms for making
sense of the particularities of intralesbian violence .... So too, hetero-
sexual women should not be required to forfeit too readily theoretical
models which speak meaningfully to the violence of their intimate rela-
tions with men......
While the dynamics of domestic violence will vary within the con-
text of each individual relationship, the same laws will still be invoked
to protect (even if they fail to protect) all victims of domestic violence,
regardless of their gender, race, class, age or sexual orientation. Thus,
these multiple discrete models will have to co-exist with a larger, more
comprehensive, meta-model of domestic violence. This meta-model
would ideally explain the basic, most common, dynamics of domestic
violence, and take into account homophobia and gender, along with
other indica of social power:
Viewing domestic violence through an integrated framework
permits us to see that domestic violence is a gender issue; that
heterosexual domestic violence is, in fact, primarily perpetu-
ated by men against women. We can also see that gender is
only one of the several determining social and psychological
factors and that the absence of gender inequity, as in same-sex
relationships, by no means precludes the possibility that bat-
tering will occur.... Because of the pervasiveness of cultural
sexism, homophobia, racism, classism, anti-Semitism, ageism,
and ableism, some groups are empowered with privileges at
the expense of others.'
However, this meta-model of domestic violence should not be con-
structed by assuming a priori gender neutrality. Instead, the multiple
contextual models need to be constructed, examined, and refined-first.
Only then should the shared dynamics be synthesized and integrated
into a meta-model. t
180. See Merrill, supra note 40, at 12.
181. Eaton, supra note 26, at 220. See also Robson, supra note 2, at 568-69 (calling for a
lesbian legal theory to account for intralesbian domestic abuse).
182. See Merrill, supra note 40.
2001]

